For the American Political Science Association - Eric Voegelin Society
Voegelin and Democratization Issues
Paul Rich
Hoover Institution and University of the Americas-Puebla
and
Guillermo De Los Reyes
University of Pennsylvania
That Eric Voegelin left Austria one step ahead of the Gestapo shows his personal sympathies for democracy, emigrating from what could be called a closure of the soul.(1) His commitment to the free society is substantiated by his disdain for the Nazis and his subsequent decision to become an American citizen,(2) yet he has been overlooked in current escalating discussions about democratization in the post Cold War world.(3) Voegelin's writings on the retheoretization of political science have something to say to those who are considering how democracy can be fostered where a democratic tradition is only embryonic.(4)
A trend in twentieth-century political science towards mathematical models and rational choice scenarios(5) means Voegelin's expansive interest in cultural conditions which would sustain a successful society put him at loggerheads with those for whom cliometrics and not culture is central.(6) His multifarious writings challenge an arguably too restricted vision regarding how democracy is achieved and maintained,(7) as he felt that attention to spirit was needed as much or more than attention to structure: "...a society must have a spiritual core" he insisted.(8) He wished to know from where the structures of government came.
However, it has proved impossible to pigeonhole his copious work: "What was to be done with a thinker who resolutely and at great personal risk opposed totalitarianism -- whether Hitler's national socialism or Stalin's communism, and would thus seem a fair candidate for the intellectual establishment's favor -- but firmly declined to embrace any of the other isms, including such friendly persuasions as liberalism or conservatism?"(9) The fact is that Voegelin admired democracy when it served the spirit, but was mindful that there might be other forms of government that could meet "the crucial demands of human and divine reality".(10)
There have been a number of recent instances where technically nondemocratic procedures have helped to meet these crucial demands of reality. After the demise of Franco, the Spanish monarchy proved to be the best influence for the transition and healing of Spanish society. In present day Bhutan, the monarchy is leading the change from a feudal society to a democratic one. Voegelin's philosophy is one that allows for transitional structures and for an institution like monarchy since Voegelin's attention is focused on the development of the spiritual potential of individuals rather than with details of administration. In other words, attention to Voegelin refocuses thought on the larger picture. He didn't denigrate discussion of the details of democracy(11) -- i.e. issues such as bi-cameralism, federalism, proportional representation and the other intricacies of the machinery -- but he discussed broad issues and had a much more aerial view of political science than most thinkers, -- although always to be remembered is that he remained concerned about order, as one might expect of the author of Order and History.(12)
The elemental emphasis, as Voegelin might call it, reflects in part a reaction to a trend over the past thirty years towards the use of rational choice theory in political science.(13) This ability of Voegelin to handle both the vastness of human experience as well as its constraints and particulars has consequences when discussing his relevance to the problems of democratization. Voegelin believed that the translation of authority (the elemental) into institutional form (the existential) deserved philosophic attention and that unless the elemental was expressed in the existential that order and government would be endangered.(14)
Democratizing the existential elements of a society without reference to the elementals underlying that society was, in his view, a recipe for failure.(15) Since organized power or government must exist or there is no large scale society, there is always a need to understand the origins of power. Perhaps then the present debate about how to insure a lasting democratization of the numerous countries that have found a new lease on life in the Cold War aftermath needs to give more attention to larger questions of historical possibility and purpose. The relatively limited attention given to the implications of the resurgence of the Russian Orthodox Church is an example of how political studies have not developed the topics with which Voegelin was concerned.
Voegelin is a powerful corrective to the trivialization of social science.(16) He was a universal man in what in respects has been a particularistic age, unwilling to accept the demise of grand theory, and a believer that "The intellectual answer to the challenges of our age in terms of scholarship is a collective project of the various disciplines; it is a sort of convergent development of a science of general structures which are not peculiar to our civilization but have their root in the nature of man, and are in their variants therefore to be found everywhere, in all societies."(17)
On the other hand, and this is one reason for Voegelin being such a challenging figure, he was unwilling to be pushed into the position of exalting ethereal general truths(18) of the "dream world"(19) at the expense of reality.(20) Voegelin, despite charges of obtuseness, shows realism in wanting to discuss obligations, especially important in considering his influence in view of the way in which much recent conversation about democracy has centered on rights.(21) Moreover, somewhat ironically for a writer who at times is so demanding on the reader, he suspects extravagant theorizing(22) and is an ally of those who insist on concreteness(23) (a word, and perhaps an attitude, which interestingly has gained considerable acceptance). He was wary of excessive abstractness and warned as does Richard Allan that "Gnostic desire for an abstract and hence indeterminate freedom, a freedom to be anything, can only destroy society."(24)
His viewed much of what was wrong with the world as what he called gnosticism,(25) a secular distortion of the Christian idea of salvation outside history in which perfection becomes a secular goal.(26) The term when used by him is partly shorn of its earlier traditional religious connotations(27) and applied instead to secular visions or nightmares.(28) His suspicion of gnosticism was substantiated by the shambles created by the world dreams of fascists and Stalinists,(29) -- yet, to the discomfort of some, he does not stop with these "usual suspects" and extends his criticisms to those who think that democracy is largely or exclusively a matter of tolerance or pluralism. In fact, the supposedly self-evident superiority of constitutional democracy seemed to him to be debatable: "Voegelin's view seems to have been shaped by his experience with National Socialism in Germany and Austria, where the Nazis made use of democratic process to further their quite undemocratic aims."(30)
The pluralist enamored of pluralism for the sake of pluralism is like the "Sunday Catholic," whose befuddled notion of "live and let live" begs the question of whether a free society can be maintained by a commitment only to pluralism: "Put differently, is pluralism capable of becoming a state religion-or, as some prefer, a 'civil religion'? It seems unlikely, despite the remarkably successful missionary work of this new faith in the last two centuries."(31) Nevertheless, he was convinced that Anglo-American pragmatism contributed to a successful political/social order.
Adjustment of governmental nuts and bolts seems as unpromising as a panacea for sustaining democracy as does a simplistic faith in pluralism. Voegelin's relevance to discussions of democratization owes something to whether, as a post-Cold War Polish thinker well puts: "There is liberalism, and then there is liberalism. We in the post- Communist societies of Central and Eastern Europe, and especially we in Poland, do not have an easy time sorting out the varieties of liberalism that are being proposed to us":
Might it not be the case that a free society cannot be sustained without the idea of absolute truth? If the denial of absolute truth is the necessary price to be paid for liberal democracy, liberal democracy is going to have a very hard time of it -- in Poland and, I dare say, in most of the world of the twenty-first century. "Pluralism" is the term that immediately and inescapably arises in such a discussion of freedom and truth. We live in a pluralistic world, we are told, and that is true.(32)
With regard to pluralism, that there is no finite truth but only relative truth is not a settled issue. Pluralism is as understandable as a means towards truth as it is as a objective unto itself: Isaiah Berlin remarks, "liberal culture teaches us about the possibility of the existence of holy principles, albeit not absolute and imperishable."(33) A society where the means completely dominate over the ends is rather like an airplane that endlessly circles and goes nowhere.
On the other hand, Voegelin was not indifferent to the role of means, and believed that both the individual and society need to find symbols of reality in order to sustain stability.(34) As Ted V. McAllister remarks in his discussion aobut Voegelin in Revolt Against Modernity: "Symbols of order maintain their legitimacy so long as conditions do not challenge them. But disorder befalls all societies. When experienced at the personal level, the disorder of an age spurs a search for new and more adequate symbols."(35) That is confirmed by how the study of symbolism viz politics has gained importance from the increasing perception that there is a connection between "re-symbolization" and democratization, albeit a connection that is still poorly understood.(36)
Symbolization has a large part to play in the extension of hegemony, democratic or otherwise, and in the constructing of political culture. Therefore discriminating amongst the varieties of such expression and understanding their effects on society is of considerable concern.(37) An obvious example of the invention of new symbolic systems is the abundance of hard-to-classify new religions; certainly there are enough manifestations to perplex scholars.(38)
Frustration in developing paradigms about symbolic systems often arises when describing and categorizing systems that are at "the loose edges" that develop in transitional periods.(39) What, for example, is the point at which personal symbols cease and civic symbols begin in this era where the secular has overtaken the sacred?(40) What indeed is the much-discussed civic religion?(41) Voegelin remarks, "Whoever seeks to interpret, noetico-critically, the order of man, society, and history finds that at the time of his attempt the field is already occupied. For every society is constituted by the self-understanding of its order."(42)
If a purposeful symbolism fostering democracy does not flourish, symbolism will still exist but will be dictated by Madison Avenue rather than by pursuivants or philosophers. Golden arches beckon the hungry, insurance policies are decorated with the Rock of Gibraltar, and automobiles are adorned with wildcats-in-profile. Companies and government departments change their logos as they seek to firm up their identity, and so do countries.(43) The recent changes in sovereignty have meant numerous changes in political symbolism. During the upheavals following the end of the Cold War, many of the former Communist-dominated states were forced to seek a new symbolic vocabulary. The world has provided quite enough excitement in recent decades to produce changes in official symbolism that will keep scholars occupied for many years to come.
The jettisoning of the trappings of the old regimes seems to bear out the contention of the anthropologist Victor Turner, who writes, "In my view it is no accident that this jangama or mystical rhetoric, charged with oxymora and metaphora, is very often characteristic of movements of egalitarian, popular protest during liminal periods of history when social, economic and intellectual structures showing great stability and consistency over long periods of time begin to show signs of breaking up and become objects of questioning both in structural and anti-structural terms."(44) In short, there is a symbiotic relationship between symbols and politics, and the change in one should signal the change in the other. As social upheavals continue to occur, new icons are created and old ones are discredited or rehabilitate. One of the first acts of any new state is to adopt new symbols. In some cases the "new" symbols are taken from non-governmental sources.
Voegelin was conscious of the inadequacy of political theory in light of the chaotic events of the twentieth century. The assertions that this or that political philosophy provided a permanent and universal answer to the human predicament was viewed unsympathetically by him. His position as described by Kenneth Keulman was that "..theories are tested and found lacking -- defeated either by the diversity of human behavior or by our inability to step outside our own social class and culture. Consequently we promote socially constrained systems as universal truth."(45) Democratization to survive involves a re-investing of objects with meaning. "...a practical present is, in part, composed of objects - artifacts and utterances - which are recognized to have survived from a near or a more distant past and are ready to be recalled from where they lie in the present, to be noticed, enjoyed or employed for what they may be made to mean or for whatever they may be worth in respect of current practical engagements."(46)
With the end of the Cold War, dissolution of the Soviet Union, and other chaotic events of recent years, Voegelin's perception of the connection between disorder and philosophy becomes particularly significant. "So long as the symbols forged out of the experience of luminosity retain a basic believability," writes McAllister, "one feels no compulsion to explore the subject. When, however, the social and political conditions fracture the symbols of order (which merge as products of a particular historical condition), the individual begins to feel the disorder in his soul."(47)
One need not totally embrace Voegelin's philosophy to appreciate that his arguments are important for debate about democratization. His view that "to be an authentic political philosopher one must also be a mystic"(48) will be difficult for some to accept, although mysticism has in his sense of the word has a strong strain of tolerance rather than of theosophy, but his warning that man's historical experience includes spiritual experience appropriately reinforces and adds a significant dimension to concerns about the dangers of considering democracy without discussing political culture.(49) As the new millennium approaches, reservations about economic materialism and technological ruthlessness -- "modernity without restraint" -- seem well in order.
Voegelin was not a pessimist about the future of humankind, closing The Science of Politics with memorable lines that "in this situation there is a glimmer of hope, for the American and English democracies which most solidly in their institutions represent the truth of the soul are, at the same time, existentially the strongest powers."(50) Arguably, to discuss democratization without discussing political culture is ineffective,and to discuss political culture without discussing Voegelin is inadequate.
NOTES
1 Ted V. McAllister, Revolt Against Modernity: Leo Strauss, Eric Voegelin, and the Search for a Postliberal Order, University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, 1995, 20.
2 See George H. Nash, The Conservative Intellectual Movement in America Since 1945, Updated Edition, Intercollegiate Studies Institute, Wilmington (Delaware), 1996, 42. Paul Caringella comments that Voegelin was unhappy with the original (1976) Nash book categorizing him as conservative, and that Voegelin voted for Adlai Stevenson in two presidential elections. Caringella conversation with Rich, 1 August 1998.
3 Surely it is not enough to consider democratization in terms of procedure; the relevance of Voegelin is that there has to be discussion of the values which the procedures presumably implement.
4 Eric Voegelin, The New Science of Politics: An Introduction, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London,1952, 2-3.
5 "...the splendid unfolding of the natural sciences was co-responsible with other factors for the assumption that the methods used in the mathematizing sciences of the external world were possessed of some inherent virtue and that all other sciences would achieve comparable success if they followed the example and accepted these methods as their model. This belief by itself was a harmless idiosyncrasy that would have died out when the enthusiastic admirers of the model method set to work in their own science and did not achieve the expected successes. It became dangerous because it combined with the second assumption that the methods of the natural sciences were a criterion for theoretical relevance in general. From the combination of the two assumptions followed the well-known series of assertions that a study of reality could qualify as a scientific only if it used the methods of the natural sciences that problems couched in other terms were illusionary problems, that in particular metaphysical questions which do not admit of answers by the methods of the sciences of phenomena should not be asked, that realms of being which are not accessible to exploration by the model methods were irrelevant, and, in the extreme, that such realms of being did not exist." Voegelin, The New Science, 4.
6 See Paul Rich and Guillermo De Los Reyes, "Post-NAFTA Political Science in North America: Political Culture, Seymour Martin Lipset, and 'Continental Divides'", Canadian Review of American Studies, Vol.27 No.3, 1997, 161-173.
7 Professor William Y. Elliott of Harvard sponsored Voegelin's immigration to the United States. Rich remembers taking Elliott's introductory government course at Harvard, which, although for freshmen, emphasized great thinkers and great issues. "In a letter to Francis Wilson on May 31, 1957, Francis Wilson Papers, University of Illinois, Urbana, Ill., Voegelin alluded to Elliott's aid in getting him out of Austria in 1938." Nash, fn. 89, 355.
8 McAllister, 169.
9 Ellis Sandoz, "Introduction", Eric Voegelin's Significance of the Modern Mind, ed. Ellis Sandoz, Louisiana State University Press, Baton Rouge and London, 1991, 3.
10 Ellis Sandoz, "Editor's Introduction", The Collected Works of Eric Voegelin (Vol.12) Published Essays 1966-1985, Louisiana State University Press, Baton Rouge and London, 1990, xxi.
11 As illustrated by Voegelin in New Science., 32-33.
12 "...[Voegelin] emphasized the historic conservative concern for order -- at the interlocking levels of being, society, and the soul." Nash, 154. See Kenneth Keulman, The Balance of Consciousness: Eric Voegelin's Political Theory, The Pennsylvania State University Press, University Park and London, 1990, 88-90.
13 See Rich and De Los Reyes, "Post-NAFTA Political Science", op.cit..
14 John J. Ranieri, Eric Voegelin and the Good Society, University of Missouri Press, Columbia and London, 1995, 84-85.
15 "The question taken up in The New Science of Politics was, how is it possible to account for the rise in modern Europe of two totalitarian regimes within twenty years of one another? Its author thought the answer would not be discovered through a simple analysis of election techniques or constitutional mechanics." Kenneth Keulman, The Balance of Consciousness: Eric Voegelin's Political Theory, The Pennsylvania State Univeristy Press, University Park and London, 1990, 16. to text
16 Kenneth W. Thompson, "Voegelin and Politics", Sandoz ed., Eric Voegelin's Significance, 20.
17 Qtd. Voegelin, Conversations with Eric Voegelin, 19. Jürgen Gebhardt, "The Vocation of the Scholar", Stephen A. McKnight and Geoffrey L. Price eds., International and Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Eric Voegelin, University of Missouri Press, Columbia and London, 1997.
18 "Political societies as representatives of truth, thus, actually occur in history. But as soon as the fact is recognized new questions impose themselves. Are all political societies monadic entities, expressing the universality of truth by their universal claim of empire? Can the monadism of such representation not be broken by questioning the validity of the truth in each case?" Voegelin, The New Science, 59. "What philosophy is about is not Truth. Philosophy can never discover any universally admissible truths; and if a philosopher happened to have made a genuine contribution to science (one thinks, say, of the mathematical works of Descartes, Leibniz, or Pascal), his discovery, perhaps by the very fact of being admitted as an ingredient of established science, immediately ceased being a part of philosophy, no matter what kind of metaphysical or theological motivations might have been at work in producing it. The cultural role of philosophy is not to deliver truth but to build the spirit of truth...". Leszek Kolakowski, Modernity on Endless Trial, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 1990, 135.
19 Voegelin, The New Science, 167. Nash, 43.
20 "In gnosticism the non recognition of reality is a matter of principle...The attitude toward reality remains energetic and active, but neither reality nor action in reality can be brought into focus; the vision is blurred by the Gnostic dream. The result is a very complex pneumopathological state of mind, as it was adumbrated by Hooker's portrait of the Puritan." Voegelin, The New Science, 169.
21 See Edmund Burke: Burke: `I never govern myself, no rational man ever did govern himself, by abstractions and universals. I do not put abstract ideas wholly out of any question because I well know, that under that name I should dismiss principles; and that without the guide and light of sound, well-understood principles, all reasonings in politics, as in everything else, would be only a confused jumble of particular facts and details, without the means of drawing out any sort of theoretical or practical conclusion' (Speech on the Petition of the Unitarians X, pp. 41-2).
22 "A free society cannot be dedicated to freedom in the abstract nor be held together only by formal commitments. It necessarily has to be committed to a concrete freedom embodied in its own specific customs, laws and institutions, which can change but only within limits. All freedom is freedom to do or be something determinate. The Gnostic desire for an abstract and hence indeterminate freedom, a freedom to be anything, can only destroy society. Hence the paradox of `the bonds of freedom'. A society free of bonds cannot be a society at all." Richard T. Allen, Beyond Liberalism: A Study of the Political Thought of L. von Mises, K. Popper, F.A. Hayek and M. Polanyi, qtd.Polyaniana: THE PERIODICAL OF THE MICHAEL POLANYI LIBERAL PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION at http://www.kfki.hu/(hu)/~cheminfo/polanyi/9601/chap13.html
23 "...liberty can exist and be understood only within a tradition of concrete liberties. " ibid.
24 ibid.
25 "Voegelin gives six checkpoints to recognize Gnostic movements:
26 John H. Hallowell, Eric Voegelin: From Enlightenment to Revolution, Duke University Press, Durham, 1975, vii.
27 "What was gnosticism? In one sense, of course, it was an ancient heresy that had threatened Christianity in its early centuries. But as Voegelin used the term, gnosticism ceased to be anything quite so esoteric or remote. instead, it was a deep-seated, persistent tendency in Western though to 'immanentize the Christian eschaton,' to transfer Christian hopes and symbols from an otherworldly orientation to an 'intramundane range of action.' " Nash, 42-43.
28 See Nash, 154.
29 "A spiritual pathology, which he too loosely called gnostic, slowly infected Western civilization by heightening people's ubiquitous sense of alienation and persuading them to seek release from or domination over this world. Visions of imminent transfiguration turned into dreams of Prometheus, of immanent transformation." McAllister, 169. See Michael Franz, Eric Voegelin and the Politics of Spiritual Revolt,: The Roots of Modern Ideology, Louisiana State University Press, Baton Rouge and London, 1992, 52. "If Voegelin did not leave us with a remedy for the fanaticism that can arise form pneumapathological consciousness, he did at least enable us to understand the nature and history of psychic disorder by reference to a parallel history of spiritual order." ibid, 134.
30 Ranieri, 208.
31 Randall E. Auxier, "Straussianism Descendant? The Historicist Renewal", A review of Leo Strauss e la destra americana, by Germana Paraboschi. Roma: Editori Riuniti, 1993, at http://www.access.digex.net/~nhi/parabos.htm . "Religare refers to what binds together, and the liberalism of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries is devoted to liberating the individual from what is binding. Some have thought this to be a rather dubious project. The Oxford historian Owen Chadwick writes, 'This was not very realistic, but at least it was the expression of faith and not of experience. The liberal mind was individualistic. It [was concerned with] solitary consciousness and its right to be respected. Nonetheless, people cannot be complete individualists if society is to survive.' It is very hard to draw the line between liberation from stifling and oppressive bonds, on the one hand, and the destruction of community, on the other. "ibid.
32 Maciej Zieba, First Things: The Liberalism that We Need, First Things 40 (February 1994): 23-27 at http://www.leaderu.com/ftissues/ft9402/zieba.html. "In this view, some people defend their homeland, others collaborate with the conqueror, and each choice is the product of a different "cultural paradigm." Some eat human flesh in the same way that others avoid pork and shrimp, because of culture. Some care for the sick and marginal, others devote themselves to eliminating the "unfit," and who is to say who is right and who is wrong? Radical pluralism-intellectual and moral pluralism-seems to be the only truth. Pluralism is thus presented as the fundamental principle of reality, the Absolute. Absolute truth is denied in the name of an absolute truth claim that eludes rational challenge and assumes the character of a religious faith. It is not too much to say that pluralism is the operative religion of at least one stream of liberal theory and practice." ibid.
33 Qtd. ibid.
34 See introductory bibliography of comments on his writings, Nash, fn. 114, 428-429.
35 McAllister, 227.
36 Seymour Martin Lipset, "The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited", 1993 Presidential Address to American Sociological Association, American Sociological Review, Vol.59 No.1, February 1994, 5. "Catholic countries, however, have contributed significantly to the third wave of democratization during the 1970s and 1980s, reflecting 'the major changes in the doctrine, appeal, and social and political commitments of the Catholic Church that occurred...in the 1960s and 1970s". Ibid., quoting Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, University of Oklahoma, Norman, 1991, 281, 77-85.
37 This includes the varieties of expression within a religious movement as well as between religious movements, and the conditions which encourage or discourage such variety. "The present transformation of religious virtuosity within Catholicism could provide an absorbing research agenda for organizational sociologists...[an] extremely fertile theoretical question in this area would be to examine the implications of having large and flourishing virtuoso groups coexisting in the same dioceses or parishes as the secular clergy...Priests and bishops today have few organizational incentives to support the founding of new religious orders. since such groups, if successful, would serve as alternative centers of power. The Vatican, however, has actively supported the establishment of conservative orders and quasi orders such as Opus Dei or Communion and Liberation, and these groups have enjoyed substantial growth as a result. This presents local bishops with the dilemma of whether or not to support the establishment of these groups within their dioceses. Supporting Opus Dei would demonstrate a bishop's loyalty to Rome, but, as a personal prelature with direct Vatican connections, its presence in the diocese would also seriously undermine his own episcopal authority." Patricia Wittberg, The Rise and Decline of Catholic Religious Orders: A Social Movement Perspective, The State University of New York Press, Albany, 1994, 271.
38 "There is, of course, no clear definition of exactly what is Protestant and what is not, and no potential strategy of definition is without pitfalls...". William H. Swatos, Jr., "On Latin American Protestantism", William H. Swatos, Jr., Religion and Democracy in Latin America, Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick (New Jersey) and London, 1995, 149.
39 See ibid., 150.
40 The same comment can be made about other countries, e.g. Hungary: "Because no nation-state can exist without a multitude of recognized, officially sanctioned public ceremonies, this theatricality was imitated in a number of similar rituals. August 20th, Constitution Day (alkotmány ünnepe) was implemented in 1948 to mute the attraction of the pre-socialist, religious holy day, St. Stephen's Day; consequently, its peaceful Catholicism was countered by a massive military parade. Thus August 20th symbolically expressed the state's identification with the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact - the external boundaries of the nation-state - whereas May Day played its part in maintaining internal order by dramatizing the state myth of communism based on working-class solidarity." László Kürti, "People vs the State: Political Rituals in Contemporary Hungary", Anthropology Today, Vol.6 No.2, April 1990, 6.
41 See Roderic Ali Camp, Crossing Swords: Politics and Religion in Mexico, Oxford University Press, New York and Oxford, 1997, 50.
42 Eric Voegelin, Anamnesis, trans. and ed. by Gerhart Niemeyer, University of Missouri Press, Columbia and London, 1978, 144.
43 Not all these changes have been successful. The public cannot recall that USX was once U.S. Steel or that International Harvester became Navistar. Sometimes a change has simply meant to loss of a valuable identity. But change is endemic to the modern world. New logos are floated every day.
44 Victor Turner, Dramas, Fields, and Metaphors: Symbolic Action in Human Society, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 1987 [1974], 292.
45 Keulman, 22.
46 Michael Oakeshott, "Present, Future and Past" in On History and Other Essays, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1983, 36. The process starts in childhood: The teddy bear is a case in point.
47 McAllister, 237.
48 Ranieri, 256.
49 Eric Voegelin, The Nature of the Law and Related Legal Writings, The Collected Works of Eric Voegelin, Vol.27, Robert Anthony Pascal, James Lee Babin, John William Corrington eds., Louisiana State University Press, Baton Rouge and London, 1991, xxiii.
50 Voegelin, The New Science, 189.
Updated on 08/25/98 by Christian Steimel