Panel “Voluntarism and Latin American Democratization”
Commentator: Alan Knight, Oxford University

VOLUNTARISM AND THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF LATIN AMERICA: VIRTUES AND VICES OF ASSOCIATIONISM

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A veteran Mexican bureaucrat is quoted by Professor Joel Migdal in 1988 as remarking, “We don’t want to talk anything about ‘organization.’ That’s what this government will not allow — organization. You can say what you wish and write what you wish and criticize as much as you like now and get away with it. But the
moment you try to organize, they’ll be right on top of you. The government will stand anything except organization.”¹ Well, some things have changed since then, and our panel today will look at developments in light of the current discussion going on around the world about voluntarism and democratization.²

One of several concerns which all of us on the panel share this afternoon is how Latin America, and Mexico in particular, will fare in the next few years. After exchanging emails and reading the papers, I think that we also all believe that the social sciences, particularly history, can not only give us at least some modest idea of what is going to happen but point to where the region should be going.

So I have framed my remarks today partly as an introduction to our panel, which as one of its tasks takes up a variety of aspects of voluntarism in relation to democratization, including the social capital, economic, historical, religious, and sociological aspects of the issue. Discussions of how to sustain the trend towards democracy in Latin America have an obvious importance for all Latin Americanists, and the possible shrinking of the state and the triumph of the private sector have received great attention. As our panelists will make clear, the scenario is not enfolding quite as straight forwardly as some have represented, nor are the historical antecedents as clear as sometimes represented. “Social movements of every type have proliferated in an increasingly dense civil society....” writes William Robinson, “But the accomplishments of social movements in organizing
the popular classes have not been matched by an ability to offset the dramatic sharpening of social inequalities, increased polarization, and the growth of poverty brought about by globalization.”

Professor Renno will en passant outline the now almost classic arguments of Robert Putnam of Harvard about the place of social capital in democratization, before he makes some surprising and important remarks about the influences in Latin America on joining and membership. Of course, the point can be made that neither in the United States nor in Mexico does the existence of intermediate or voluntary associations guarantee democracy, and in the Mexican case the role of some prominent non governmental organizations (NGOs) has, in my opinion, been more detrimental to democratic development than helpful.

Mexican NGOs are not always creches of democracy. They often reflect the fact that Mexican culture has not entirely lost its strong personalismo flavor, and from personalismo there comes caudallismo, authoritarianism, along with popular apathy. The great political cartoonist Thomas Nast portrayed a feisty Mexican in the pages of Harper’s Weekly in the 1880s, with cutlass in one hand and pistol in the other. Nast conceded with his drawings that Mexicans were a forceful, if not always lovable, neighbor. With the consolidation of one-party control in the late 1920s after the Revolution, cartoons of Mexico change. The rise of the PRI produced the sombreroed dozer, the Mexican slumped on the ground in a perpetual siesta, a big sombrero shading him from the world. How to make the disenchanted
want to return to the civil society they so distrust is a major challenge. Generalizations made about Mexican voluntarism have not spoken to this dilemma, decades of apathy.

Attention But Not Accolades

However, in light of our research emphasis on voluntarism we do note with some satisfaction that the current debates about civil society in Mexico show that political culture and civil society are finally getting the attention they have always deserved from political science. There is now a growing conviction in many quarters that even a basic approach to political science requires understanding what is meant by those terms. Actually, this is not a dramatic recent discovery. Steven Brint claims that Aristotle was the first to emphasize the ties between democracy and political culture, and to assert that understanding political culture was the key to holding power in society.

Heightened curiosity about how a healthy political culture might be sustained has become almost synonymous with an increased interest in research into the conditions fostering democracy. Larry Diamond remarks, “Increasingly, scholars are recognizing the symbiotic nature of the relationship between state and civil society, in the process of democratic consolidation and more generally. By enhancing the accountability, responsiveness, inclusiveness, and hence legitimacy of the regime, a vigorous, pluralistic civil society strengthens a democratic state and moves it toward consolidation.”

In the international case, while it is generally agreed that the encouragement of voluntarism and associationalism is crucial for nurturing and sustaining
democracy, the role of NGOs in countries which are in transition from nondemocratic regimes requires more critical attention than it has received.\textsuperscript{11} As NGOs become increasingly active in international affairs, they “...often display none of the transparency they seek in others, hide the sources of their funding and represent only narrow special interests, not the wider public.”\textsuperscript{12} While, “Their star is rising as they fill voids left by retreating governments,” at the same time they, “...are becoming variously secretive, power hungry, and/or close-minded.”\textsuperscript{13} But in the face of that, an argument can be made that the absence of internal democracy does not always matter, since voluntary organizations regardless of their own polity fulfill a representative function in order to attract members and survive.

None of our panelists think the state is dead. In fact, Professor Morales finds that the new North America being created by NAFTA is still very much a government driven one, and that voluntary organizations have not been as effective in the new North American community as some of us, including myself, thought ten years ago that they would be. Like Ronald Inglehart, he is a partial sceptic about the influence so far on contentalization of the environmental and union groups when compared to the influence of governments and of economics.\textsuperscript{14} As he demonstrates, a great deal of what has happened since NAFTA was signed has been business driven, and the heady cultural expectations are still unfulfilled.

In sum, voluntarism is not the prepackaged solution to democratization in Mexico or anywhere else,\textsuperscript{15} and voluntary organizations are not axiomatically a replacement of the state. As will be discussed, the Masons and Opus Dei are non-governmental organizations whose contribution to Spanish and Latin American
democracy can be questioned, and we should be chastised by the fact that the Orange Order in Northern Ireland is also an NGO. Seymour Martin Lipset remarks in *Elites in Latin America* that high-status social clubs often have sustained the governing class.\(^{16}\) While, “Civil associations have been widely regarded as basic elements in civil society...civil associations may not necessarily engender civil society.”\(^{17}\) Furthermore, economic problems can be so dire and on such a scale that they require governmental rather than private solutions.\(^{18}\)

**Balancing Economics and Voluntarism**

Thus, observations by Lipset and others about the importance to democracy of the level of economic development stand, and this is one of the reasons that Professor Morales brings an important contribution to this panel. However, if economics helped to create the problems of nation states now trying to democratize, it is not as certain that economics alone is going to solve the problem. When all the reservations are made, one still hopes for much from the nongovernmental sector and there is evidence that voluntarism does have an increasing role in political change in Mexico. As Barbara Misztal emphasizes, “…the questions of how social trust is produced and what kinds of social trust enhance economic and governmental performance increasingly become the central set of theoretical issues in social sciences.”\(^{19}\)

For example, in Mexico since the Chiapas uprising of 1994,\(^{20}\) some promising changes, as far as democracy is concerned, are outside the formal government structure.\(^{21}\) Much of the decision making now takes place in the informal spheres.\(^{22}\) Writes, with exaggeration, the Mexican political columnist Juan Ruiz Healy, “-- the
NGOS are already as powerful as the Church and the Army.” Confirming his point, Mexico’s President Zedillo has found it prudent to break with precedent and meet with NGO representatives, worried that they would make good on a threat to prevent the passage of a free-trade agreement with the European Union.

There are a good many undemocratic NGOs. As already mentioned, two powerful organizations which can be found in most Latin American countries and which are prominent in Mexico are the Freemasons and Opus Dei. The scholar Noberto Bobbio directly compares Opus Dei with the Grand Lodges of Freemasonry, although another writer, Giuseppe Corgiliano claims this is like comparing Moors with Franciscans. Bobbio refers to the mysterious atmosphere of both organizations and to the distrust with which they are viewed by non-members.

_Totalitarian Voluntarism_

Both Masonry and Opus Dei are global. Mexican Masonry likes to boast, as does Opus Dei, of being worldwide. It is by far the older movement, as Antonio Lara will illustrate in his paper, and has been part of the Mexican scene for at least two centuries. It is an ancient foe of the Catholic Church. The Mexican Inquisition hunted people with Masonic connections: in c.1785 a Mexican, Manuel Zuralds, along with a Frenchman and an Italian, was tried for being Masons. Mexican Masonry becomes more visible during the chaos of Guadalupe Victoria’s
term as president of the infant republic, when the two principal political and Masonic groups of the day styled themselves as the *Yorquinos* and the *Escoseses*.\(^{27}\)

Early years of Masonic fratricide were followed by another distinct era in Mexican Masonic history, that of the presidency of Benito Juárez.\(^{28}\) Juárez was Grand Master of the National Grand Lodge which had been established in 1825, and his Masonic allegiance is usually coupled with his anticlericalism.\(^{29}\) This National Grand Lodge seems to have been dependent on the personality of Juárez and his leadership seems to have been more for the sake of keeping the Masons from mischief than for advancing their cause. When he died in 1872, the national lodge he had headed vanished: “It probably suffered a quiet decline and disappearance, partly because of the death of Juárez and partly because of the revolutionary change by the rise of state Grand lodges and the federal Gran Dieta...”\(^{30}\)

As his successor, Porfirio Díaz was too politically astute to repudiate Juárez, in actuality a longtime adversary, either in politics or in Masonry. Such was the totemistic power of the presidency of Juárez that Díaz, who had fallen out with him, felt compelled to invoke his shade. Masonry was particularly useful in this way to Díaz, particularly if one accepts the thesis that he deliberately pursued a Machiavellian conciliation policy: “At the same time that Díaz reached
a reconciliation with the Church, he had to retain the loyalty of powerful Liberal anti-clerical
groups in the county. He achieved this difficult balance in part by keeping one foot in the anti-
clerical camp.” He seized Masonic leadership in Mexico and kept it until his fall from office and
the end of his gerontocracy in 1911, but the subsequent history of Freemasonry in Mexico,
which one might describe as totalitarian voluntarism, was no less tied to political power.

No wonder then, with such Masonic influence, that Catholics wished for a
countervailing organization of social prestige with which to oppose Masonic
machinations and thus sought first and largely unsuccessfully to popularize the
Knights of Columbus and then, with more success, Opus Dei. The Catholic
Church in Mexico has in its support originally for the Knights, and then for Opus
Dei, in a sense been attempting to create its own alternative Masonry, to sponsor
successful camarillas (cliques or networks which became central to Mexican
politics), Catholic camarillas.

Wolves in the Chicken House

The Knights, Opus Dei, and Freemasonry, as they function in Mexico at
the start of the 21st century, lack the ecumenical and community building spirit
that one associates with voluntary groups in the United States and perhaps
demonstrate that Mexicans “embrace simultaneously both a deep-rooted
anticlericalism and a profound religiosity.” Moreover, the three societies share
public relations problems. They have negative images and are the common target of conspiracy buffs,\textsuperscript{37} of Cassandras who smell plots everywhere.\textsuperscript{38}

Mexico, where crisis always seems near, is susceptible to fantasizing about conspiracies. It would be easy to believe that, behind devaluation, assassination, and general destabilization, there was some purposeful scheme. Nothing is worse than a movie without a plot. The title of one article in the Mexican press is hardly atypical: “Esoterismo + Intereses Personales + Manipulación + Anticristianismo + Antivalores = Masonería”.\textsuperscript{39}

Part of the explanation for suspicions about the Caballeros, Opus Dei and Freemasonry is the pseudonymity associated with them.\textsuperscript{40} Members of these societies would energetically deny that their secrecy was anything more than circumspection. Yet, a reason for their persistence in Latin America and particularly in Mexico may be that the region is one where closed door cabalistic ceremonies and rituals have been integral to leadership.\textsuperscript{41} Arcane organizations long have been a part of the political fabric.\textsuperscript{42}

The demanding ritual life of the three movements supports a thesis that they are “total” or “greedy” institutions, i.e. supporters can immerse themselves in a ceremonial world that will take all of their time and commitment.\textsuperscript{43} The sacrifice is rewarded with ample baubles as within Freemasonry and the two Catholic
organizations there is considerable recognition and honor. Moreover, although their proponents stoutly deny that either society has political goals or political influence, accusations persist that they have such influence.

Carrying comparisons further, they lay their members under lifelong obligations. For example, Opus Dei requires from those joining a solemn declaration of loyalty in addition to the obligations that are required from a communicant Catholic, and which comes according to its statutes “in response to a divine vocation”: “…the term ‘agreement’ or ‘contract’ by itself cannot express all the ecclesiological meaning of that ‘formal declaration’, which Opus Dei’s founder from the early days used to call a ‘commitment of love and service’. The Freemasons extract a series of blood oaths of obedience which long have caused discussion as to their appropriateness.

Another significant similarity is that the groups regard each other as serious threats to the Mexican state. Each, it could be remarked, is the other’s favorite enemy. They take seriously the claims of the other to have influence, and of their own vocation as defenders of the truth. To accomplish that, having members in high places is a natural goal. Escrivá de Balaguer remarked that “God wants a handful of men ‘of his own’ in every human activity.”

As for victors in this quixotic contest, the Knights and Opus Dei can take satisfaction in recent progress of the Church in regaining power. No longer are
clergy prevented from appearing in their habit on the streets. Clerics increasingly appear positively in the media. In Mexico, the State's accommodation with the Roman Church has given the Masonic brethren considerable unease. The now disgraced President Salinas promoted reconciliation, and this was followed by actual Constitutional amendment. At the same time, anticlericalism reinforced by Freemasonry remains a Mexican tradition, especially within the PRI as the ruling party and as custodian of the Revolution. There is an uneasy standoff between the two sides, and the continued existence of an anti-Catholic Freemasonry and an ultramontane Opus Dei is symbolic of that impasse.

How really powerful these secret societies remain in contemporary Latin America is open to question, but one suspects that “...an essential element in the explanation of the legitimation of the modern state is rooted in imaginary networks of political power...Contemporary Mexico is a country that offers an especially interesting forum for the study of these networks...” Undeniably these societies do have some significance for Mexico’s political culture.

If voluntarism was until recently neglected topic in American academia, attention to it has been even less in Mexico. Mexican Masonry for example has gone unchallenged in its statements about being the guardian of the Revolution, and source of democratic values. The Mexican Masonic myth is that the values of the Republic are Masonic values. Devout Mexican Masons, if the
term can be used, have been insistent in claiming that Freemasonry has benefited Mexican political life and protected the Constitution. The success of such a public relations exercise is rather remarkable if one considers that, on the face of it, Mexican Masons for many years have been tied principally to the PRI, and in fact to the most conservative wing of the PRI.

In conclusion, I strongly suggest that examining Mexican voluntary movements is essential to understanding of politics south of the Rio Grande. The history of voluntarism in Mexico and possibly in Latin America illustrates that not all associations are surefire promoters of democracy. Mexicans cannot be described as Americans are, as “...hyperactive joiners, creating strong and durable voluntary organizations from Little Leagues and 4H Clubs to the National Rifle Association, the NAACP, and the League of Women Voters.” That leaves us with a major problem viz democratization if, as Tocqueville wrote, “Among laws controlling human societies there is one more precise and clearer, it seems to me, than all the others. If men are to remain civilized or to become civilized, the art of association must develop and improve among them at the same speed as equality of conditions spreads.”

The civil society discussion has passed through its infancy, when all voluntary associations were regarded as the answer to all social ills. As the
inter–paradigm debate rages, we now realize there are some wolves in the chicken house, and have begun to look at them with the scepticism they deserve.


4. “There is something spectacular and perhaps ironic about the way in which civil society has burst into social sciences literature in recent years after lying dormant for so long. An important component of Western political thought, the concept was neglected in the West for most of the twentieth century, while it gained more common use in Marxist terminology and some of its derivatives (Gramsci used the term in opposition to the oppressive fascist state). Its new surge, however, occurred
just as socialism declined and a capitalist market-oriented socioeconomic order began to spread throughout the world.” Victor Azarya, “Civil Society and Disengagement in Africa,” Harbeson et. al., p.85.


7. Ibid.


9. “But the development of a stable and effective democratic government depends upon more than the structures of government and politics: it depends upon the orientations that people have to the political process - upon the political culture. Unless the political culture is able to support a democratic system, the chances for the success of that system are slim.” Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963), p.498.


15. “The possible cooptation of civil society opens up yet a further empirical proposition of considerable importance: Cooptation of civil society may ultimately undermine the state even if, in the sort run, cooptation seems to sustain the government...might not the relative influence of government and society at large upon how civil society functions have possible cause-and-effect relationships concerning the health both of state formation processes and of socioeconomic development?” Harbeson, “Civil Society and Political Renaissance,” p.19.


However, as Putnam realizes in his work on the United States, governments also may be a source of social capital. Policy performance can be a source of trust, not just a result. Putnam argues that the major source of generalized trust is intermediate associations. These may, in fact, play an important role. However, I remain unconvinced that the social capital and, more particularly, trust that emerges from these mechanisms is sufficient for producing generalized trust. There is considerable evidence that state institutions can, under certain circumstances, lay the basis for generalized trust.” Margaret Levi, “Social and Unsocial Capital: A Review Essay of Robert Putnam’s Making Democracy Work,” Politics & Society, 24:1, March 1996, p.50.


Ibid. Also see Peter L. Berger, Para una teoría sociológica de la religión, (Barcelona, Spain: Editorial Kairós, 1971).


“It should be noted that the word for ‘Scottish’ or ‘Scots’ as an adjective in France until about mid-XVCIII century, was ‘Écossois’. This, and any other archaic French spelling...[now appear] as ‘Écossais’. Both words have, of course, identical meaning.” A.C.F.Jackson, Rose Croix: The History of the Ancient and Accepted Rite for England and Wales, rev.ed.,Lewis Masonic, London, 1987 [1980], xii. All kinds of confusion has been caused by the way in which Freemasonry in Mexico during the Díaz era, has been described as primarily Scottish. Freemasons in the early part of the nineteenth century were called Scottish and Yorkist. The two terms are widely used in Mexican history books discussing the Mexican independence movement in the 1820s, but it is doubtful whether either the authors or students reading the texts understand what the terms mean. The Scottish-Yorkist troubles crystalized in the revolt against President Guadalupe Victoria in 1827, which found the Scottish Riter supporting the vice president, Nicolás Bravo, while the Yorkists lined up behind Victoria. Actually, the parties that made war against each other in that period were neither Scottish nor York in the sense that present-
day Masons use the term. They practiced neither Scottish nor York Masonry as the term was generally used in the nineteenth century, and both — at least for some years — followed Continental European rites of Masonry which are commonly called Scottish. “Soon the entire population of the country became divided into two factions, the Escoceses and the Yorkinos. The former were in favour of moderate measures, under a central government, or a constitutional monarchy. The latter were the advocates of republican institutions, and the expulsion of the ‘old’ or native Spaniards. The Escoceses — originally the ‘Scots Masons’ — numbered among their members all who, under the ancient régime, had titles of nobility; the Catholic clergy, without exception; many military officers; together with all the native Spaniards of every class. The republican party, according to one set of writers, viewing with dismay the program of their opponents, resolved “to fight the devil with his own fire,” and therefore organized a rival faction, on which they bestowed the name of Yorkinos, the members of which were supposed to be adherents of the York Rite.” Robert Freke Gould, *The History of Freemasonry: Its Antiquities, Symbols, Constitutions, Customs, Etc.*, Vol.VI, T.C.&E.C.Jack, Edinburgh, n.d., 370. Gould’s History first appeared in 1903. Cf. George F.Adams, “Freemasonry in Mexico”, *Philalethes*, Vol.XXXIII No.3, June 1970, 54.


30. Coil, 413. Another grand lodge using the same name would be active in the twentieth century, claiming a continuity which has not been proved.


32. Towards the very end of his administration, “A growing number of Mexican Protestant pastors and schoolteachers, many with links to Masonic lodges and Liberal circles, were taking an increasingly active part in protests and demonstrations over the Díaz economic policies and lack of political freedom.” Michael Tangeman, *Mexico at the Crossroads: Politics, the Church, and the Poor*, Orbis Books, Maryknoll (New York), 1995, 30.


34. The recruitment policy of Opus Dei dovetails nicely with the prevailing Mexican tradition of political recruitment: “The vehicle responsible for most political recruitment in Mexico remains the camarilla, a personal networking device as
important in the nineteenth century as it is today. Its significant role will endure into
the twenty-first century.” Roderic Ai Camp, Political Recruitment across Two

35. Yvon Vaillant, La Santa Mafia: el expediente secreto del Opus Dei, trs. José
Fernández Valencia, Mexico, D.F., 1972, 9-86. Indeed, in its early days, in Franco’s
Spain, Opus Dei was accused of being a “Jewish sect with links with the
Freemasons” and investigated by the special tribunal in Madrid that was
eradicating Freemasonry: “Opus was hauled before this tribunal. Its members, the
judge — a general — was told, live respectable, busy and chaster lives. ‘Do they
really live chaste lives,’ asked the general, and when he was assured they did so,
he dismissed the case. ‘Never known a chaste mason yet’, he said in explanation.”
Walsh, 45.

Prospects of Changing State-Church Relations”, Riordan Roett ed., The Challenge
of Institutional Reform in Mexico, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder (Colorado)

Armand Mattelart, is one of the most famous examples of the Disney-as-Satan
school. An exercise in Marxist deconstruction, with footnotes citing such diverse
sources as Eldridge Cleaver and Umberto Eco, it purports to reveal all the dark
capitalist schemes being hatched through Disney comics published in Latin
America...[the president of Disney, Michael Eisner] spoke about his plans to bring in
Georgetown University as a consultant on the Virginia theme park...‘I’m impressed
with Jesuit education.’ Along with the Masons and the Illuminati, the Jesuits have
long figured in the most elaborate global-conspiracy theories.” William F. Powers,
“The Uber Mouse: What will Disney’s world hegemony mean for our culture?”,

“What it comes to then is that the pluralist society, honestly viewed under
abdication of all false gentility, is a pattern of interacting conspiracies...I would like to
relieve the word ‘conspiracy’ of its invidious connotations. It is devoid of these in its
original Latin sense, both literal and topical. Literally it means unison, concord,
unanimity in opinion and feeling, a ‘breathing together’...Civil society is formed, said
Cicero, ‘conspiratio hominum atque consensu,’ that is by action in concert on the
basis of consensus with regard to the purposes of the action. Civil society is by
definition a conspiracy, ‘conspiratio plurium in unum.’ Only by conspiring together
do the many become one. E pluribus unum.” John Courtney Murray, “America’s
Four Conspiracies”, Earl Raab ed., Religious Conflict in America: Studies of the
Problems Beyond Bigotry, Anchor/Doubleday, Garden City (New York), 1964,
226-227.

38. They are lumped with Bohemian Grove, the Club of Rome, Bilderbergers, Skull
& Bones, and the Lucis Trust as part of the Illuminati conspiracy. E.g. Texe Marrs,
Dark Majesty: The Secret Brotherhood and the Magic of a Thousand Points of
Light, Living Truth Publishers, Austin (Texas), 1992, 122. Also Daniel Ryder,
Breaking the Circle of Satanic Ritual Abuse, CompCare Publishers, Minneapolis (Minnesota), 1992, esp. 11-25.


40. “Masonry stresses the importance of secrecy for at least two principal reasons. The first is that the element of secrecy itself is something that attracts men and makes them feel important. They have access to what they believe are vital secrets and truths that other men do not share. The second reason is because it offers the Craft a stabilizing influence. Men who swear extremely solemn oaths of secrecy to the Lodge not only conclude that the information is important but that it must be protected at all costs.” John Ankerberg and John Weldon, The Secret Teachings of the Masonic Lodge: A Christian Perspective, expanded edition, Moody Press, Chicago, 1990, 30


42. One of the most interesting is the Guadalupes, a secret society particularly important in the period 1810-1814 and akin to the Sons of Liberty who played a part in the American Revolution. They played an important part in the revolt against Spain, and the council for ruling Mexico City (the Ayuntamiento) and the lawyers’ guild had many members, and membership certainly overlapped with the Masons. Virginia Gueda, En busca de un gobierno alterno: Los Guadalupes de México, Instituto de Investigaciones Históricas, Serie Historia Novohispana, number 46, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 1992. But in reviewing the book in American Historical Review (December 1994, p.1788), David W. Walker of Michigan State University remarks, “...missing is an effort to tie this analysis of the Guadalupes concretely to the broader literature and body of theory that relates the workings of these kinds of secret political societies to state-building and political modernization processes.” Moreover, until a thorough prosopography (collective biography) is done, just what the specifics of the connections with the Masons were will remain a mystery.

43. “While neither El Camino nor the 1950 Constitution of Opus Dei gives much evidence of any deep spiritual understanding on the part of their author, they set up a style of spirituality reduced to external practices in which it is easy to find security. The practices are, for the most part, designed to be relatively simple to observe in the midst of a busy professional life. It is Mgr Escrivá’s genius to have concocted a manner of life especially suited to the bourgeoisie, the growing middle-class of Spain from the mid-1940s onwards.” Walsh, 109.

44. The founder of Opus Dei petitioned for and was given the title of Marques de Peralta and received the Grand Cross of St. Raymond of Peñafort, Grand Cross of Alfonso X the Wise, Grand Cross of Isabel the Catholic, as well as other decorations. Walsh, 22.

46. ibid.

47. “To keep exactly in my heart all the secrets that shall be revealed to me. And in failure of this my obligation, I consent to have my body opened perpendicularly, and to be exposed for eight hours in the open air, that the venomous flies may eat of my entrails, my head to be cut off and put on the highest pinnacle of the world, and I will always be ready to inflict the same punishment on those who shall disclose this degree and break this obligation.” Oath of the candidate in the Master Elect of Fifteen degree. J.Blanchard, et al., *Scotch Rite Masonry Illustrated*, Charles T. Powner, Chicago, 1979, 196.

48. qtd. José Luis Illanes, “The Church in the World”, Rodríguez, 127. “‘We are a family with supernatural ties.’ These words of Monsignor Escrivá, often repeated by him and cited a number of times in this book, show the source or origin of the family spirit proper to Opus Dei: it is born of an awareness of cooperating together in a divine union, which transcends human differences...”. ibid., 187-188.


51. “For our purpose we may regard the political culture as a shorthand expression to denote the emotional and attitudinal environment within which the political system operates. It is the ‘particular pattern of orientations’ in which, according to Gabriel Almond, every political system is embedded. Borrowing from Talcott Parsons, we can be a little more precise at this point, and say that we are concerned with orientations towards political objects. Orientations are predispositions to political action and are determined by such factors as traditions, historical memories, motives, norms, emotions and symbols.” Dennis Kavanah, *Political Culture*, New York, Macmillan, 1972, 11.

52. There are no public or substantial lodge-maintained Masonic research libraries in Mexico, let alone anything like the major collections maintained by the Grand
Lodge of England or the Scottish Rite in Washington. What we have seen of
Mexican Masonic archives has been disturbing: an ‘archive’ in Puebla is kept in a
room whose ceiling has collapsed, and is exposed to the elements. To our
knowledge there is only one research group of Masons in Mexico (a York lodge),
and it has neither published nor met for years. Moreover, the reception of inquiries
to Masonic authorities is sometimes met with an almost ferocious hostility. The
rituals and records are regarded as absolutely secret.

53. In the 1820s, at the time of the York and Scottish troubles in Mexico, there was
considerable feeling in the United States that Masonry was antithetical to
democracy: “One of the major elements which went into forming the new Whig
party was the Anti-Masonic party, an anti-elitist group which had emerged in the
late 20’s to fight the presumed influence of a Masonic cabal, of which Andrew
Jackson was thought to be a member.” Seymour Martin Lipset, The First New
Nation: The United States in Historical and Comparative Perspective, Norton

54. In answer to inquiries, the author was assured on a visit to the Grand Lodge of
the Valley of Mexico in Mexico City in Spring 1994 that the then candidate (and
now President) Zedillo was a Mason and indeed had joined the more universally
recognized Mexico City body after belonging for a time to a lodge obedient to
another, less recognized grand lodge.

55. Raising questions about Masonic claims is not to be taken as a prediction that
further investigation is going to totally upset the image so energetically propagated
by Masons of patriotic Freemasonry in Mexico, an image of the lodge as par
excellence an anti-clerical, liberal political movement. This image may well be
proved partially true.

56. e.g. several of the Masonic lodges in Puebla meet in a historic church near the
city square, which was allocated to them after the Revolution and which the
government has provided as a lodge hall for a peppercorn rent ever since. A similar
situation prevails in Bermuda, where the government receives an actual peppercorn
from the Masons at a colorful ceremony each year.

57. See Alex Inkeles and Masamichi Sasaki, “Preface”, Alex Inkeles and Masamichi
Sasaki eds., Comparing Nations and Cultures, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs (New
Jersey), 1996, xi-xv.

58. ibid., 293. However, Fukuyama is not sanguine about the state of associational
life in the United States: “Robert Putnam has compiled data that points to a striking
decline in sociability in the United States. Since the 1950s, membership in voluntary
associations has dropped. Although America remains far more religious than other
industrialized countries, net church attendance has fallen by approximately one-sixth;
union membership has declined from 32.5 to 15.8 percent; participation in parent-
teacher associations has plummeted from 12 million in 1964 to 7 million today;
fraternal organizations like the Lions, Elks, Masons, and Jaycees have lost from an
eighth to nearly half of their memberships in the past twenty years.” ibid., 309.

59. Fukuyama, 272.

60. de Tocqueville, 517.


63. “In other words, unless voluntary associations are explicitly directed against large social forces such as economic inequality or racism, they can end up reinforcing them. They can do this either by passively replicating maldistributions of wealth and power in their own organizational structures, or by actively promoting them, as in the case, say of the Ku Klux Klan’s crusade for racial segregation and inequality.” “Anne Kornhauser on the civil society trap”, *Civnet Journal*, August–September 1999, Vol.3 No.4, at http://www.civet.org/journal/vol3no4/rvakorn.htm