Draft

American Political Science Association.

Panel 15-2: The Internet and Social Change: Uses of the Internet

3:30 pm Saturday, 31 August 1996, San Francisco

THE CRISIS IN MEXICAN FEDERALISM: CHIAPAS IN PERSPECTIVE

Paul Rich

Hoover Institution, Stanford, and University of the Americas-Puebla, Mexico

rich@udlapvms.pue.udlap.mx

Guillermo De Los Reyes

University of Pennsylvania and University of the Americas-Puebla, Mexico

williamr@udlapvms.pue.udlap.mx

Precis: At the very time that the possible contributions of federalism to democratization are getting serious attention in Mexico, fears of separatism are interfering with revitalization of the federal system. An understanding of the issues in Chiapas helps to explain such concerns.

The difference between a discussion of federalism in Mexico and of federalism in the other countries being discussed today is that whereas there certainly are problems in Germany and India, the political situation in Mexico has reached the point where the survival of the political structure as it has been known for decades is in question. This is doubly unfortunate if one believes that strengthening federal systems is a way to improve the effectiveness of government and a way to promote democratization of society.

The Mexican situation begs the question as to just how effective federalism is. The problems of politics are often thoses of integration and assimilation, and we are seeing all over the world the difficulties that go with cultural diversity. Even in the United States the fear of cultural secessionism is never very far from public consciusness - witness the edesire to make English an official language.

The attention that implementation of the Constitution of 1917 and its strongly federalist provisions is getting in Mexico today has been long overdue, but in some respects the interest could not have come at a worse time. It is raining during a flood. Not only in Chiapas, but in Guerrrero, Michoacán, Oxaca, Hidalgo, Puebla, and Chihuahua there are disturbing signs not of devolution of authority but of disintegration of authority. This comes at a time when the Mexican president has claimed that "New fedralism is weeping through the country."

In Chiapas at the end of 1994 an event took place which dramatizes the problems facing Mexican federalism. There were two state governments, each claiming to offer the best hope for ending the year-old rebellion that the Zapastista Armuy of National Lbieration was leading in the eastern portion of the state.

. The first was that headed by Eduardo Robledo of the Partido de la Reolución Institucional (Party of the Institutionalized Revoluiton or PRI), who austensibly had won the August 1994 elections. Sr. Robledo had be inaugurated in the City Theatre rather than the statehouse because of security fears. President Ernesto Zedillo was present for the rituals. But also claiming to be governor was Amado Avendaño, gubernatorial candidate of the Partido de la Revolución Democrátia (Party of the Democratic Revolution or PRD). His swearing in lacked the presence of President Zedillo but included marimba music, incense, and formal presentation of the 'ruling cane', a stick festooned with ribbon.

This was neither the first nor last case of the federal government in Mexico City, i.e. the ruling party, interfering in state politics and usurping the legimately elected officials. The PRI is not a party in the American sense, but more of a family firm and social insurance scheme which has co-opted hundreds of thousands if not millions of supporters by handouts. Decaying, it presides over a country where recollections of President Salinas' boasts about the fruits of the NAFTA pact and President Zedillo's 1994 election promises to provide for the "well-being for your family", and advertisements of himself as a leader who "knows how to do it" produce hollow laughter.

President Zedillo states that "We will push ahead with the transfer of authority, resources and responsiblity from central government to other levels of government." But a fear in Mexico is that the country might experience the same problems as other countries with federal systems. Federalism seems to encourage secessionism, with examples ranging from Canada and Italy to Yugoslavia and the former Cechoslovakia, and that is not a very good background to discussing federalism. The prospect of disintegration is not as farfetched as it seems, when one of Mexico's leading intellectuals, Carlos Fuentes, frankly concedes that "...the pro-Americans in Mexican society do not disguise their hope that Mexico can become a sort of un declared fifty-first state of the Union."

The future of Mexican federalism has a close relationship to the troubles in the southern Mexican state of Chiapas that began in January 1994 and which are remarkable for the notoriety of the Zapatista guerrillas' leader, the enigmatic Subcomandante Marcos. The uprising by the Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (Zapatista National Liberation Army or EZLN) has had a substantial effect on Mexico's political expectations.

However, Mexico's political structure is reacting not to one crisis in Mexico but to layers of crises. One set of problems has partly been created by NAFTA., but the Chiapas uprising has as well called attention to the demands of indigenous people in a number of Mexican states to have a voice in political affairs Evidence about this is abundant; the leader of the Chiapas revolt, Subcomandante Marcos, is a prolific writer. Once written, the letters and essays are often "on the Internet by the next morning". Indeed, he has been pursued electronically by the Mexican government, troubled at being "a helpless victim of the information age" and seeking to get its counter-insurgency position out on the net. Marcos use of the Internet underlines the tragedy of the peasants in a competitive North American economy. They are not online. It is their white urbane leader who is online. The Internet is widening the gap between the haves and have-nots.

"The aim of devolving more power from central government to individual states has been a recurring theme of the current administration" according to one observer. But that is power being distributed by a government which acquired it undr shady circumstances. The attack by the rebels on the Mexican government is a reminder of it the current regime's shaky legitimacy. Carlos Salinas won or stole the 1988 presidential election after a supposed computer failure attributed to overloaded circuits and "atmospheric conditions", and then claimed to have put Mexico permanently on the high road economically.

The Chiapas uprising has never been about an ultimate military success by the insurgents since even the inept Mexican army could overpower them in any sustained operations. Rather, it is in respects a massive publicity campaign against the political structure of Mexico. In its use of the media it is the first postmodern revolution - postmodern according to no less an authority than the celebrated Mexican historian Lorenzo Meyer. It is a different sort of guerrilla uprising, a source of post-communist revolutionary statements which many people thought the end of the Cold War had permanently ended. The Chiapas guerrillas claim to be "the intellectual vanguard for an internationalist, libertarian world-view". Chiapas has met with considerable success in attracting a global audience, and the revolt has become a rallying point for the indigenous throughout Latin America.

The emergence of religious and ethnic pride among Latin America's indigenous focuses attention on those states where they have a large presence, and rouses fears of "heading down the road to another Bosnia". Any renewal of federalism would be accompanied by the insistence that existing laws recognizing Mexico's "pluricultural composition originally based on its indigenous people" be recognized. The noted indigenous writer Irineo Rojas notes that "We are legally well protected, but we are still a long way from this being applied in practice. We are in the same position now as we were centuries ago."

The Chiapas movement revolves around the charismatic image of Marcos, who holds forth in a curious but attractive prose, encabronado (like a furious cuckold) in style. No one is absolutely sure of his identity, let alone his computer enthusiasms. Marcos himself has enjoyed spinning alternate tales about his past, including that he was queer and worked in a gay bar in San Francisco. Since the parentage of Mexican President Ernesto Zedillo has itself been questioned, assertions being that he was not the son of the humble electrician Rodolfo Zedillo but of a government official who had abandoned Ernesto and his mother, who is to say with certainty that Marcos is the son of a Tampico furniture store owner? Andres Oppenheimer writes, "Were the Zapatistas real Zapatistas? Was Zedillo a true Zedillo? How could one write about a country where one could not only not trust what people said, but wasn't even sure whether people were who they were supposed to be?"

However, despite denials, there is a great deal of evidence that he is Rafael Sebastián Guillén, onetime university professor. Professor Guillén's disappearance coincides with Marcos' appearance and would help account for why he is accused of being in a time warp, a Marxist from the 1960s in Banana Republic-tailored fatigues who is fighting not for democracy but against capitalism and for a one-party proletarian state. Curiously the rebel leadership have Masonic connections, so apparently some guerrillas are Marxist Masons!

Whoever he is, as an image-maker leader Marcos is miles ahead of Mexican President Zedillo, sometimes called El Nerd or Agua al Tiempo (water at room temperature, after his favorite drink). Marcos has attemped to fight fire with fire, in the sense that he provides an alternative leadership which is perceived as more exciting and more interesting that Zedillo's inept administration. That Marcos has tried to project a strong image at this time in Mexico's history confirms that Mexico still suffers froms a legacy of personalismo, that the perception of your power and of who you know is more important than what you know. Personalismo will be put ahead of the law, and from personalismo there comes caudallismo, authoritarianism. This prevails over the Constitution and over the rule of law. It is responsible for the imperial presidency, which is now in the hands of Zedillo starting to unravel. In rural states such as Chiapas, it is at its most virulent. This caudallismo depends on the control of information and suppression of speech, on bribery and on patronage. So although devolution of power to the states might seems a logical way to answer Marcos with his demands about the treatment of the indigenous and peasantry, the states are themselves the bulwarks of the worst kinds of caudallismo.

While the Chiapas uprising is a demand for enfranchisement by a group which has heretofore been voiceless, the condition of local and state government in Mexico is so bad that federalism would seem an invitation to anarchy. Poignancy is added to the present situation by recalling how upbeat Mexicans had been just a couple years before the fall, believing that with the signing of NAFTA and with the booming stock market that a rosy future beckoned and full democratization was around the corner. Actually, had anyone bothered to look deeper during the Salinas presidency, which so enthusiastically promoted itself, the rot was widespread. The announcements about progress were not matched by realities. Mexico was certainly premature in announcing that it had become a first world country.

The income level of individual Mexican states varies drastically. Yet, as Marcos points out incessantly, the poorer states have tremendous unrealized potential - Chiapas' poverty contrasts with its immense natural resources. For example, Chiapas produces nearly fifty percent of Mexico's natural gas and sixty percent of its hydroelectric power, along with substantial amounts of lumber, coffee and beef. Ironically, in some areas seventy percent of the homes do not have electricity. Unsurprisingly this mix of obvious wealth and cutting poverty has contributed to the uprising: "It is precisely in regions with a high percentage of indigenous peoples that can be found a systematic political, juridical, economical violence that has led, in some cases, to the outbreak of violent, armed conflicts. The EZLN, in Chiapas, was born amongst indigenous peoples who, most of all demand dignified living conditions. They prefer, as they say, risking their life in a dignified manner, rather than dying little by little from the diseases of poverty."

The Chiapas guerrillas despite their Marxist rhetoric appreciate that the worldwide trend towards capital-intense development is leading to further inequalities between states. "One of the ironies of the twentieth century," remark Joseph Nye and William Owens, "is that Marxist theorists, as well as their critics, such as George Orwell, correctly noted that technological developments can profoundly shape societies and governments, but both groups misconstrued how. Technological and economic change have for the most part proved to be pluralizing forces conducive to the formation of free markets rather than repressive forces enhancing centralized power." It is obvious to the guerrillas that Chiapas and the other poor states can not fully take advantage of NAFTA without enormous amounts of capital, and they suspect that the majority of the population of those states can never realize any advantage from the agreement.

Events since the initial January 1994 uprising have only confirmed that viewpoint. In December 1994, just after Zedillo was inaugurated, the Mexican financial system collapsed. The peso was devaluated by fifty percent and total chaos was only avoided by a controversial fifty-billion dollar bailout engineered by the Clinton administration. Now the chief concern was not how to face the new world created by NAFTA, but how to survive at all. In the first six months of 1995, more than one million Mexicans lost their jobs. Inflation became rampant: gasoline went up by thirty-five percent in one jump and then began further monthly increases. Similar price rises involved such staples as food and electricity. Since a similar situation had been faced in the 1980s, no one in the Mexican underclass expected anything but years of privation. In 1996 in Mexico the minimum day's wage will buy 6 quarts of milk or 2.2. pounds of beans, whereas in 1976 it would buy 21 quarts of milk or 5 pounds of beans. It will buy two and a half pounds of sugar or two gallons of gasoline, whereas in 1976 it would buy sixteen pounds of sugar or eleven gallons of gasoline.

One problem with Mexican federalism then is that if it is strengthened it may incrase the chances for some sort of secessionist movement or aid strong local political bosses who are even less sympathetic to genuine reform that the bosses in Mexico City. There are tradeoffs involved which lead in unkown directions. Until now the guerrillas have stayed away from talk of independence but the black cloud is there. Fuentes writes, "Governments can no longer respond with authoritarian, centralist measures. And there can no longer be coherent policies based on the incoherence of electoral fraud. As it has in its culture, Mexico must now bring together its society and politics. Otherwise, like Maradona, we shall be booted out of the game."

In essence the revolt asks just what happens in states such as Chiapas during the free market transition period when social programs are being dismantled. In Mexico today only 11.37 million of the economically active population of 24.89 million have regular paid jobs. The rest survive with part time employment. (Arguably the United States too has not been exempt from the downside to free market economics.)

Since January 1994, little has gone right (no pun intended). For the poor in a rural state such as Chiapas, which is called 'Mexico's basement', the situation continues to deteriorate. Mexicans are indeed paying dearly for the long PRI rule, which has had an effect on the country's personality as well as its pocketbook, and for plunging into an experiment like NAFTA without public discussion.

Marcos has been trying to enlarge his support, taking advantage of the economic crisis and suspicins of NAFTA. In July 1996 he staged a conference to protest free-market capitalism: "...using the Internet to summon supporters from around the world, Zapatista rebels are staging a mini-Woodstock of the information age - a rally against big business in the mountains of southern Mexico. Swapping e-mail addresses and singing revolutionary songs, leftists from 41 countries on five continents met." The Zapatistas have signed a pact with El Barzón, which is the debtor movement of the middle class, farmers, and small businessmen. El Barzón repudiates the bank loans and mortgages which are now in default. El Barzón national president Juan Jose Quirino Salsas has warned that, "We will not permit that in this battle for a new Mexico anyone lays hands on a single Zapatista. We will not permit that the worthy men who fight in the Barzon be put in jail." El Barzón claims 850,000 members.

The Chiapas rebellion also has been followed by a guerrilla action in Guerrero known as Ejército Popular Revolutionario or EPR, and by still anotehr uprising in Sierra Madre Oriental. Actions in Guerrero have taken place only thirty miles from Acapulco, directed by "Comandante Antonio". Prospects of peace in Mexico have much to do with the ruling hierarchy's dealing with these interests, which have been largely ignored and which perceive economic freedom as only compounding their grievances.

The future of free trade and of neolibralism in Latin America in general requires discussion with minorities such as the indigenous of Chiapas, peoples that have long embraced antistatism in the face of decades of authoritarian domination. At least that they are now demanding such discussion is more promising than if they were unrepentant anarchists. But should the rhetoric raise suspicions of balkanization, those who fear that the uprising harbingers a new Mexican medievalism of hopelessly overlapping authorities will claim vindication.

The Internet may be a help to the rebels getting their story out and to promoting the image of Marcos as a "with-it" person, but the Internet is not a place where the indigenous agrarian cultures which the Zapatistas claim to defend are cherished: "...such an environment rapidly breaks down not merely boundaries but cultures themselves." And the use of such technology casts doubt on the rebellion as one led by peasant Indians. Marcos himself is an educated, white, technologically savvy media star, a Zorroized Zapata. He is English-speaking, enabling him to give press interviews to gringo reporters who know neither Spanish nor Mayan. Just how much a leader of the indigenous against the new North American community he can really be can be debated.

So the ultimate effect of the Chiapas rebellion on Mexican federalism is uncertain. The impression should not be left that Chiapas preoccupies Mexicans. At least according to polls, far more Mexicans are concerned about economic issues such as unemployment then they are about Chiapas itself. While 52 percent think creating new jobs should be a first priority of government, only 3 percent think solving the Chiapas conflict should take priority. When Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, the presidential candidate of the opposition Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD), met Marcos during the 1994 election campaign, the effect seems to have been that voters were scared that his election might bring on civil war.

On the other hand, Chiapas has been the equivalent of a parliamentary vote of no confidence in recent Mexican developments. There are those who feel that the remedy to the impasse may be what America needed - and got with Franklin Roosevelt - a restoration of confidence through a charismatic leader. Roosevelt's remedies may or may not have contributed as much as was claimed to tactual economic recovery, but there is no denying that they contributed mightily to the recovery of confidence. The virtues and vices of economic strategies may be debated at jungle meetings in Chiapas, but there will be no substantial investment in Chiapas or in Mexico in general unless strenuous efforts are made to instil confidence in the country's path to democratization.

In that light, reform of the federalist system and efforts to get Marcos and his cohorts to put down their guns and enter the political system make sense. Marcos may have a future in mainstream Mexican politics. A charismatic leader requires a crisis in order to shine and there is certainly a crisis in Mexico. Roosevelt had the Great Depression and World War II. Churchill had the Battle of Britain. Lenin had the Russian Revolution. Marcos has acquired his leadership partly because of NAFTA, the devaluation, and the decomposition of the PRI. He is popular throughout Mexico, and surprisingly so with the middle class.

Still, while Zedillo may lack Marcos' flare, so far he has not become the personfication of evil that Salinas has. He appears to have a genuine empathy for the poor. His family had little and he shined shoes as a boy: "Mexicali residents recall that Zedillo was approached during a campaign stop...by a young boy who offered to polish his shoes. Zedillo refused. The future president then stooped and shined the boy's shoes instead."

Political reform in Mexico could eventually mitigate the force of Marcos' accusations and rob him of the crisis that has promoted his standing. Federal colonialism could end and end soon. The 1997 Mexican congressional elections may see the PRI lose its majority in Congress for the first time since its founding in 1929. A harbinger is the fact that in the 1994 presidential election the PRI only got 50 percent of the vote, while PAN, the right-of-center party got 27 percent and the PRD, which includes a number of leftish movements, received 17 percent. Electoral reforms so far have included independent registration and polling booth officials, limits on campaign expenditures, and equal access to the media. States are promised more unrestricted monies for their own programs. More changes are promised.

Meanwhile, in one of the contradictions that make the whole situation so interesting, the Subcomandante with his old-fashioned leftish messages and suspicion of development policies comes "Whizzing through the electronic ether of cyberspace at thousands of information fragments per second, a familiar masked pipe-smoking visage...". Mexican Foreign Minister Jose Angel Gurria with some irritation has called it "an Internet war". The Rand Corporation's David Ronfeldt calls it "netwar".

In Mexico today it is not just the political structure of Chiapas that is decomposing: "Other states are tinderboxes awaiting a spark. In Tabasco, Governor Carlos Maderzo continues to cling to office despite documented evidence of his having spent more than 60 times the legal limit in his campaign...Tensions are also running high in Oaxaca and Puebla. In Morelos - a state on Mexico City's southern border governed by a former army colonel - state police recently fired into a demonstration, killing one person and wounding several more. Despite an inaugural pledge to 'create a nation of law', President Zedillo has done almost nothing to control the lawless behavior of subordinates."

Much more could be said about the problems facing Mexican federalism. The thirty-one states each have their own downsizing dilemmas. One big headache is that many of them have their own overdue loans, and are looking to Zedillo to bail them out. Perhaps federalism is like an expensive car that only countries with a stable political culture can afford. Is this the time to end vertical rule, push devolution, and experiment with the balnce of powers? The threat is that a long overdue devolution of the federal powers to the Mexican states will flounder because of an increasingly grave ethnoregional situation of which Marcos is a highly visible part.

To end on a hopeful note, there are some signs that Mexican politicians are aware of the seriousness of the situation. One indication of this is that the Federal Chamber of Deputies in Mexico City has actually sponsored a course for its members on federalism. Organized by the National Institute of Public Administration, the classes have attracted more than 100 deputies and government officials, and has included comparative study of the federalist systems of Mexico, the United States, Canada, Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela. The two-month seminar ended with the confering of diplomas in federalism, which at least indicates that the Mexican propensity for academic titles remains strong.